I. Introduction
Before British rule, the territory now known as Ghana consisted of numerous ethnic groups and communities that governed themselves.1 To consolidate these tribes into one colony, the British used traditional authorities, namely chiefs, as proxies to rule the people, bringing local political structures under British colonial authority.2 After Ghana's independence in 1957, multiple reforms aimed to decentralize government, including the Provisional National Defence Council’s (PNDC) reforms in 1988. The PNDC, the ruling military regime at the time, passed these decentralization reforms for three reasons: administrative efficiency, grassroots participation, and political legitimacy.3 With grassroots participation, a concept familiar to pre-colonial Ghana, and political legitimacy, which was pursued through a representative democracy, seeming to be at odds, it was necessary for the government to integrate these two concepts. And though foreign governmental frameworks can succeed wholesale outside their countries of origin, their effectiveness often depends on how well they adapt to local institutions and traditions.4 The PNDC’s attempt to combine Western governmental frameworks with native traditions of local self-governance placed these systems side by side rather than integrating them into a cohesive governance model.
II. 1988 Decentralization Reforms
Section 2 of the Local Government Law, 1988 (PNDCL 207), established 110 local government assemblies, succeeding the former 65 district councils.5 These assemblies divide the country into districts to decentralize power. The law had three objectives: administrative efficiency, through transferring responsibilities from the central government to local authorities; grassroots participation, the idea of communities helping themselves, tied to Ghana’s pre-colonial culture; and political legitimacy, which the military PNDC pursued by creating elected district assemblies, its first step toward representative democracy. The PNDC aimed to achieve this by creating elected local government institutions, district assemblies, which were the genesis of representative democracy, a Western-influenced framework, under the PNDC.7
Foreign governmental frameworks can work abroad, but their effectiveness often depends on how well they adapt to local institutions and traditions. The PNDC demonstrated this by attempting to adapt its new representative democracy through incorporating grassroots participation.
III. Traditional Authorities & Grassroots Participation
Traditional authorities in pre-colonial Ghana were indispensable figures in local communities. Various regions and localities in Ghana defined a chief's role differently, but generally, chiefs were expected to support their communities by helping “fulfill the hopes and aspirations of the community.”8 They had a broad mix of responsibilities, including customary, judicial, and religious roles.9 During the colonial era, traditional authorities were used to carry out the wishes of the British Crown, which led some communities to view chiefs as agents of colonialism.10 After independence, their influence was weakened even more, this time by direct legislative means.11 Section 2(1) of PNDCL 207 establishes District Assemblies as the highest political authorities within their districts, placing formal district political authority in institutions separate from traditional chieftaincy.12 Although chiefs lacked guaranteed representation in the District Assemblies, they still maintained practical influence within their communities.13
On the surface, PNDCL 207 may seem like a plausible way to adapt representative democracy to the Ghanaian political environment by combining it with indigenous politics (grassroots participation), but this reasoning falls apart on closer examination. One problem is the overlap between the responsibilities of traditional authorities and District Assemblies. Traditional authorities often play an important role in organizing grassroots initiatives, especially by mobilizing community labor and resources for local development.14 In line with grassroots participation, localities and traditional authorities were expected to support and fund local development. At the same time, District Assemblies levied taxes on these localities and were formally responsible for district development. These overlapping responsibilities created an environment in which locals were taxed for local development but also expected to raise their own funds.15 Without a formal coordination mechanism, District Assemblies and traditional authorities could pursue development independently, placing overlapping financial demands on the same communities.16 These problems result from placing these two political frameworks side by side instead of integrating them. This does not mean representative democracy is incompatible with traditional Ghanaian governance or that traditional authorities need their pre-colonial responsibilities back; it means democracy must be fully adapted to local political culture in order to work optimally, which the PNDC failed to do.
One way to address this contradiction is to formally guarantee chiefs or other traditional authorities a consultative role in District Assemblies' development planning.17 Keeping these roles consultative is enough to communicate and coordinate development responsibilities and doesn’t grant chiefs additional decision-making authority, since no one is required to implement their advice. However, District Assemblies still have an incentive to cooperate with traditional authorities because chiefs still hold considerable influence in their communities, especially in mobilizing residents and resources for local development.18 This could reduce duplicated responsibilities and financial burdens by fostering collaboration or at least awareness between the two parties.
IV. Conclusion
Especially in the United States, democracy can seem like a “saving grace” for countries in political strife. Although installing democracy may improve a country's political conditions, attempts to establish democratic institutions have sometimes failed partly because they disregarded the existing political environment.19Adapting these “imported ideas” to existing political institutions and traditions makes for a more effective implementation. In reality, it may sound straightforward, but integrating foreign political models with local institutions can be difficult, especially when both have different sources of authority and overlapping responsibilities. The PNDC's combination of representative democracy and grassroots participation may have been well-intentioned but struggled to integrate these conflicting ideas effectively. Formally guaranteeing traditional authorities a consultative role in District Assemblies' development planning could improve coordination between traditional authorities and District Assemblies and reduce overlapping responsibilities that characterized the PNDC's reforms. Policymakers and reformers in similar international contexts should prioritize meaningful integration of traditional and modern governance mechanisms to strengthen legitimacy, participation, and development outcomes rather than install democracy wholesale.
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Footnotes 1. See Callistus Mahama, Local Government and Traditional Authorities in Concert: Towards a More Productive Relationship, 4 Commonwealth J. Loc. Governance 7, 8–9 (2009). 2. See Mahama, supra note 1, at 9–10. 3. See Richard C. Crook, Four Years of the Ghana District Assemblies in Operation: Decentralization, Democratization and Administrative Performance, 14 Pub. Admin. & Dev. 339 (1994). 4. See Valentin Seidler, When Do Institutional Transfers Work? The Relation Between Institutions, Culture and the Transplant Effect: The Case of Borno in North-Eastern Nigeria, 10 J. Institutional Econ. 371 (2014). 5. See Local Government Law, 1988, P.N.D.C.L. 207, § 2 (Ghana); Mahama, supra note 1, at 8–9. 6. See Mahama, supra note 1, at 11–12. 7. See Crook, supra note 3. 8. Mahama, supra note 1, at 11 (quoting Dankwa III (2004)). 9. See Mahama, supra note 1, at 9, 11–12. 10. See id. at 9–10. 11. See id. at 10. 12. See Local Government Law, 1988, P.N.D.C.L. 207, § 2(1) (Ghana). 13. See Mahama, supra note 1, at 12–13; Prince Osei-Wusu Adjei, Abrefa Kwaku Busia & George Meyiri Bob-Milliar, Democratic Decentralization and Disempowerment of Traditional Authorities Under Ghana’s Local Governance and Development System: A Spatio-Temporal Review, 10 J. Pol. Power 303 (2017). 14. See Mahama, supra note 1, at 12–13. 15. See Crook, supra note 3; Mahama, supra note 1, at 12–13. 16. See Mahama, supra note 1, at 13–14, 16–17. 17. See Mahama, supra note 1, at 19–22. 18. See id. at 12–13. 19. See Seidler, supra note 4.