I. Introduction

In a 2024 interview, Vladimir Putin characterized Ukraine as an “artificial state” shaped by the will of Joseph Stalin.1 Whether true or not, this characterization offers a glimpse into the logic behind the Kremlin’s rationalization of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine as well as the 2014 annexation of Crimea. For context, during WWII, the Soviet Union seized territory from both Poland and Romania, and acquired Transcarpathia through a post-war treaty with Czechoslovakia. These three territories were added to what was then Soviet Ukraine and remain a part of the country today.2 Alongside the claim that Ukraine is an “artificial state,” another justification more pertinent to the Russian invasions of Ukraine, is pro-Russian sentiment.3 Along the Russo-Ukrainian border, many Ukrainian regions share elements of Russian culture, particularly its history and language. Though culture alone does not necessitate support for Russian policy, it can create a kind of affinity that allows individuals to favor closer political ties with Russia.4 For example, in the Donbas region (Ukraine), which is now largely under Russian occupation, there are two main separatist groups: the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR). Both groups emerged in Ukraine but sought the secession of their respective regions.5 Evidently, there is genuine support for regional secession from Ukraine, but who gets to decide whether one can actually secede? While international law recognizes the right to self-determination, Article 73 of the Ukrainian Constitution restricts territorial changes by mandating an all-Ukrainian referendum, meaning a majority of participating voters across Ukraine (not only those in the seceding region) must also agree to secession.6 This seeming tension between domestic and international law raises a question: What does the right to self-determination mean if it cannot be exercised independently?

II. Self-Determination and the Right to Secede

According to the United Nations (UN), “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination,” which is defined, in part, as the people’s freedom to determine their own political status.7 To put this into context, self-determination is typically realized in an internal sense, meaning it occurs within the framework of an existing state.8 This concept can be likened to U.S. statehood. New York, for example, has its own political system but still operates within the framework of the United States. Contrarily, external self-determination, which is usually realized in more extreme cases, is defined as “[t]he establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people.”9 If the people of New York decided to secede from the U.S. and operate their territory with complete independence from it, this would be regarded as external. On March 16, 2014, a referendum was held in Crimea on whether it should be reunified with Russia or restore its 1992 constitutional arrangement with Ukraine—there was no option to maintain its existing arrangement with Ukraine. An overwhelming 96.7% of the reported votes chose to reunify with Russia.10 If we accept this figure as accurate and ignore the fact that the referendum violated Ukraine’s Constitution, transpired during the Russian occupation of Crimea, and was administered under the auspices of armed foreign gunmen, we are left with a compelling question. Would international law allow for Crimean reunification with Russia given its apparent popular support?11 The answer is unclear. Because this reunification would constitute Crimea’s integration with Russia, it would be considered an attempt to exercise external self-determination. As discussed above, this right is generally realized only in exceptional cases. These would include colonial rule; alien subjugation, domination, or exploitation; or, potentially, a denial of meaningful internal self-determination (remedial secession), although this last basis remains contested in international law.12 Because the Crimean people were not under colonial rule or alien subjugation under Ukrainian administration before Russia’s intervention, the only remaining potential basis for secession would be remedial secession. At the time, Crimea held the status of an Autonomous Republic within Ukraine, which is a form of internal self-determination, so claiming it was denied this right would be misguided. The remaining question is whether this autonomy was sufficiently meaningful, and there was no significant evidence to suggest otherwise.13

III. Putin’s Kosovo Argument

Two days after the Crimean referendum, Putin addressed Russia, the West, and the rest of the world, defending what had occurred in Crimea. One of his defenses invoked the Kosovo precedent, a prominent example of unilateral secession. In 2008, without consent, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia.14 Given Serbia’s revocation of much of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, the human rights abuses against its ethnic Albanian population, and the years of failed negotiations with Serbia, it is understandable why Kosovo declared its independence.15 And while many argue that Kosovo’s secession was legally justified due to these factors, the International Court of Justice’s narrow ruling did not determine the legality of Kosovo’s secession. The ICJ found that there was no general prohibition against declarations of independence but did not determine the legality of Kosovo’s subsequent secession, distinguishing the act of declaring independence from secession itself.16 In his address, President Putin claimed that Kosovo did exactly what Crimea was doing then.17 Although this comparison was not entirely unfounded, Putin failed to acknowledge that the absence of a prohibition against declarations of independence does not establish a legal right to unilateral secession, and this is true even in the case of Kosovo. Thus, as a matter of law, the Kosovo opinion cannot be used as a sufficient basis for the reunification of Crimea and Russia, let alone the Russian occupation.18 However, Putin may have a point when considering the fact that neither secession has been deemed legal though the circumstances surrounding each secession were largely dissimilar.19

IV. Conclusion

So, who actually gets to decide whether a region can secede from a state? Regarding Crimea, as established, international law neither explicitly gives nor denies the right to unilateral secession.20 As for domestic law, Ukraine requires approval through an all-Ukrainian referendum meaning, regardless of whether the people of Crimea wanted to secede, the decision would rest with voters throughout Ukraine. This is consistent with the UN’s insistence on territorial integrity, and without it, legal secessions could fragment the geopolitical landscape.21 But what does the right to self-determination mean if it cannot be exercised independently? There is an important distinction between the right of self-determination and an unconditional right to independence. In practice, the right of unilateral secession is conditionally justified under exceptional circumstances, including those discussed above.22 It is when none of the explicit criteria are met, as in the case of Crimea, that there is much ambiguity. Nonetheless, the international stage is not strictly governed by law. Kosovo, for example, achieved de facto independence from Serbia without an established legal right to secede and is recognized by more than 100 countries.23 Similarly, despite the legal objections to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Crimea remains effectively under Russian control.24 This is not to say that domestic and international law should be ignored in favor of political power moves, but that law is not the sole motivation of countries.

Footnotes

1. Vladimir Putin, Interview with Tucker Carlson (Feb. 9, 2024), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fOCWBhuDdDo. 2. See weeks.de, Ukraine’s Changing Borders, https://www.weeks.de/en/projects/ukraine-map (last visited Oct. 30, 2026) (map identifying territorial additions in 1939, 1940, and 1945); see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, vol. IV, doc. 511 n.31, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v04/d511. 3. See Vladimir Putin, Address by President of the Russian Federation (Mar. 18, 2014), https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. 4. See Pew Rsch. Ctr., Chapter 2. Ukraine: Russian Influence Unwelcome (May 8, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/05/08/chapter-2-ukraine-russian-influence-unwelcome/; Steven Pifer, Putin and Ukraine’s East/West Divide, Brookings (May 14, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/putin-and-ukraines-eastwest-divide/. 5. See Tomasz Piechal, The War Republics in the Donbas One Year After the Outbreak of the Conflict, OSW Commentary, no. 174, June 17, 2015, at 1–3, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/192106/commentary_174.pdf. Russia subsequently claimed to annex the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2022; the UN General Assembly rejected the attempted annexation as invalid under international law. See G.A. Res. ES-11/4, paras. 2–4 (Oct. 12, 2022). 6. See Constitution of Ukraine art. 73; Law of Ukraine on the National Referendum, No. 5475-VI, arts. 18, 93 (Nov. 6, 2012) (Ukr.), https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/anot/en/5475-17. 7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see also U.N. Charter art. 1(2). 8. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 126 (Can.). 9. Id. paras. 126–27 (quoting G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex (Oct. 24, 1970)). 10. 96.77% Crimeans Vote to Join Russia—100% Ballots Processing Data, Interfax-Ukraine (Mar. 17, 2014, 9:50 AM), https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/196263-amp.html; Foreign & Commonwealth Off., In Response to President Putin’s Address to the Russian Parliament (Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/in-response-to-president-putins-address-to-the-russian-parliament. Interfax reports the commission’s figure as 96.77%; the UK response refers to 96.7%.1 11. See Foreign & Commonwealth Off., supra note 10; Constitution of Ukraine arts. 2, 73, 134–35; Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through L., Ukraine—Referendum in Crimea, https://docs-venice.coe.int/Newsletter/NEWSLETTER_2014_1/1_UKR_EN.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2026). 12. Secession of Quebec, 1998 2 S.C.R. 217, paras. 131–35, 138; see also Simone F. van den Driest, Crimea’s Separation from Ukraine: An Analysis of the Right to Self-Determination and (Remedial) Secession in International Law, 62 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 329, 340–46, 351 (2015). 13. See van den Driest, supra note 12, at 350–52; Constitution of Ukraine arts. 134–39. 14. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, paras. 75–77 (July 22). 15. See Hum. Rts. Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, ch. 2 (Oct. 26, 2001), https://www.hrw.org/report/2001/10/26/under-orders/war-crimes-kosovo; Kosovo, 2010 I.C.J. 403, paras. 64–73. 16. Kosovo, 2010 I.C.J. 403, paras. 51, 56, 79–84. 17. Putin, supra note 3. 18. See Kosovo, 2010 I.C.J. 403, paras. 56, 81–84; U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 19. See Foreign & Commonwealth Off., supra note 10; van den Driest, supra note 12, at 346–48, 351–52, 357–60. 20. See van den Driest, supra note 12, at 351, 357–60; U.N. Charter art. 2(4); G.A. Res. 68/262, paras. 1, 5–6 (Mar. 27, 2014). 21. See Constitution of Ukraine art. 73; U.N. Charter art. 2(4); G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex (Oct. 24, 1970). 22. See Secession of Quebec, 1998 2 S.C.R. 217, paras. 126, 131–35, 138; van den Driest, supra note 12, at 340–46, 351. 23. See Bureau of Eur. & Eurasian Affs., U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Relations with Kosovo (July 28, 2021), https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-kosovo/. 24. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Monitoring Mission in Ukr., Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, Including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol: Report of the Secretary-General, 1 July–31 December 2025, paras. 1–3 (June 26, 2026), https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/Situation-of-human-rights-in-the-temporarily-occupied-territories-of-Ukraine-including-the-Autonomous-Republic-of-Crimea-and-the-city-of-Sevastopol-report-of-the-Secretary-General-1-July-31-December-2025; G.A. Res. 68/262, paras. 1, 5–6 (Mar. 27, 2014).